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Modeling and measuring class conflict in Russia’s regions

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  • Steven Lloyd Wilson

Abstract

This article tests whether latent class conflict exists in Russia. It does so by theorizing that if class conflict exists, it should be reflected in the tax policy. The article constructs an original formal model of the authoritarian tax policy choice, finding equilibria in which the local government takes into account public sentiment even in the absence of elections, in an effect that resembles a market. This public sentiment is operationalized by performing a large- n latent Dirichlet allocation topic analysis of Russian regional newspaper articles dealing with the middle and working classes. In empirically testing its formal model, this article finds evidence that certain tax policy is driven by class conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Lloyd Wilson, 2019. "Modeling and measuring class conflict in Russia’s regions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 31(4), pages 432-463, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:31:y:2019:i:4:p:432-463
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463119885189
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    References listed on IDEAS

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