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Alcohol use among adolescents as a coordination problem in a dynamic network

Author

Listed:
  • Rense Corten

    (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

  • Andrea Knecht

    (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany)

Abstract

Whereas most research on substance (ab)use by adolescents studies only the effects of personal networks of adolescents, we propose a theoretical approach that allows for predictions on the effects of the macro -level social network structure on usage rates. We model alcohol use as risk-dominant but inefficient behaviour in a coordination problem, given that adolescents face incentives to align their behaviour with their friends. We propose a game-theoretical model in which actors choose behaviour in a repeated coordination game in an endogenous network. Predictions on levels of alcohol use depending on initial network structure are based on computer simulations of this model. We test the predictions using longitudinal data on alcohol use and friendship choices in school classes in Dutch high schools. We replicate the predicted ‘catalysing’ effect of initial network density on the development of alcohol use but the predicted opposing effect of centralization could not be confirmed.

Suggested Citation

  • Rense Corten & Andrea Knecht, 2013. "Alcohol use among adolescents as a coordination problem in a dynamic network," Rationality and Society, , vol. 25(2), pages 146-177, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:25:y:2013:i:2:p:146-177
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463112473793
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sanjeev Goyal, 2007. "Introduction to Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks," Introductory Chapters, in: Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks, Princeton University Press.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 265-291, November.
    3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Currarini, Sergio & Fumagalli, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2017. "Peer effects and local congestion in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 40-58.

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