Agents’ beliefs and the evolution of institutions for common-pool resource management
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DOI: 10.1177/1043463110387268
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- Cecilia Navarra & Elena Vallino, 2014. "Who had the idea to build up a village organization? Some evidence from Senegal and Burkina Faso," Working Papers 1411, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
- Navarra, Cecilia & Vallino, Elena, 2014. "Who had the idea to build up a village organization? Some evidence from Senegal and Burkina Faso," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201407, University of Turin.
- Ghorbani, Amineh & Ho, Peter & Bravo, Giangiacomo, 2021. "Institutional form versus function in a common property context: The credibility thesis tested through an agent-based model," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
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- Clark, Matt & Andrews, Jeffrey & Hillis, Vicken, 2022. "A quantitative application of diffusion of innovations for modeling the spread of conservation behaviors," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 473(C).
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Keywords
agent-based simulation; common-pool resources; institutional building; resource management; sustainable development;All these keywords.
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