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Revolutionaries, despots, and rationality

Author

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  • Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis

    (Stockholm University, Sweden, niklas.olsson-yaouzis@philosophy.su.se)

Abstract

The role of groups has often been invoked as an explanation of how successful revolutions can be the outcome of rational action. This paper attempts to show that the focus on groups fails to incorporate an important aspect of oppression, namely the oppressive regime itself. If rational choice theory is to be taken seriously and if it is assumed that the potential revolutionaries are rational, then similar assumptions should be made about the despot. If this is done, then it is far from obvious that groups help to solve the free-rider problem. Rather it is shown that in this case the revolutionaries become subject to a higher order free-rider problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis, 2010. "Revolutionaries, despots, and rationality," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(3), pages 283-299, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:283-299
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463110374497
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    2. Jack A. Goldstone, 1994. "Is Revolution Individually Rational?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 139-166, January.
    3. Morris Silver, 1974. "Political revolution and repression: An economic approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 63-71, March.
    4. Manfred Tietzel & Marion Weber, 1994. "The Economics of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 58-78, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karl-Dieter Opp, 2013. "Norms and rationality. Is moral behavior a form of rational action?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 383-409, March.
    2. Niccolò G. Armandola & Malte Doehne & Katja Rost, 2024. "Explaining mobilization for revolts by private interests and kinship relations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 36(2), pages 254-285, May.

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