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Frequent Voter Recontracting: On Constitutional Choice and Minority Group Power

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  • Richard R. Barnett

    (University of York)

Abstract

The Buchanan and Tullock Constitutional Choice model is examined. It is shown that it is important to distinguish between the concepts of negative and positive voter power and between cases in whichfrequent voter recontracting is and is not possible or likely to occur. Allowing for frequent voter recontracting it is further shown that positive voter power—the power to take action on behalf of the group rather than simply to prevent action from being taken— must lie, in any meaningful sense, with a majority coalition .

Suggested Citation

  • Richard R. Barnett, 1981. "Frequent Voter Recontracting: On Constitutional Choice and Minority Group Power," Public Finance Review, , vol. 9(3), pages 309-319, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:9:y:1981:i:3:p:309-319
    DOI: 10.1177/109114218100900304
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barton, David M, 1973. "Constitutional Choice and Simple Majority Rule: Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 471-479, Part I, M.
    2. Tullock, Gordon, 1973. "Constitutional Choice and Simple Majority Rule: Reply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 480-484, Part I, M.
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