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Fiscal Enforcement and Elections in the Context of High Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Drini Imami
  • Geoffrey Pugh
  • Endrit Lami

Abstract

The effect of electoral competition on corruption, rent-seeking and informality remains poorly understood, especially in the context of post-communist economies. In a context where there is little moral value attached to law abidance, businesses or households that engage in informal activities might perceive a tolerant government as “magnanimous†and might be persuaded to support it in upcoming elections. In this paper, we investigate the case of Albania, a post-communist transition economy, characterized by high levels of corruption. The objective of this paper is to obtain insight into fiscal enforcement during elections, hence to further our understanding of the relationship between corruption, clientelism, informality and elections in the context of a transition/post-communist country. To this end, we report complementary quantitative and qualitative analysis suggesting that the incumbent deliberately lowers monitoring of enforcement vigilance before elections (e.g., through lower/fewer fines) and yielding insights into how such behaviour effects come about.

Suggested Citation

  • Drini Imami & Geoffrey Pugh & Endrit Lami, 2024. "Fiscal Enforcement and Elections in the Context of High Corruption," Public Finance Review, , vol. 52(5), pages 679-714, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:52:y:2024:i:5:p:679-714
    DOI: 10.1177/10911421241234116
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