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Strategic Tax Planning for State Tax Amnesties

Author

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  • Justin M. Ross
  • Neal D. Buckwalter

Abstract

Tax amnesty programs have exploded in popularity among cash-strapped states since the beginning of the Great Recession. Though many scholars have been interested in the long-term tax compliance effects after amnesty programs, this article is the first to consider short-run compliance effects just prior to a known amnesty—a moral hazard effect leading to strategic delinquencies. Evidence of this is detected from year-over-year tax revenue change in quarters just prior to an amnesty program. Regression analysis on pre-amnesty periods for state tax amnesty programs between 1982 and 2011 indicates that states experience higher pre-amnesty revenues when recent delinquents are excluded from amnesty participation. The point estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) indicated that about 4.3 to 6.4 percent of an average amnesty’s recovery came from strategically delayed payments, whereas IV/2SLS put the range at 12.9 to 16.5 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Justin M. Ross & Neal D. Buckwalter, 2013. "Strategic Tax Planning for State Tax Amnesties," Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(3), pages 275-301, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:41:y:2013:i:3:p:275-301
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142112461687
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Masiya, 2019. "Lessons from Voluntary Compliance Window (VCW): Malawi's tax amnesty programme," CESifo Working Paper Series 7584, CESifo.
    2. Bayer, Ralph-C. & Oberhofer, Harald & Winner, Hannes, 2015. "The occurrence of tax amnesties: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 70-82.
    3. Neal D. Buckwalter & Nathan Y. Sharp & Jaron H. Wilde & David A. Wood, 2014. "Are State Tax Amnesty Programs Associated with Financial Reporting Irregularities?," Public Finance Review, , vol. 42(6), pages 774-799, November.
    4. Canavire-Bacarreza, Gustavo & Eguino, Huáscar & Heller, Lorena & Roman, Soraya, 2023. "When do tax amnesties work?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 350-375.

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