Whistle-blowers as a Deterrent to Tax Evasion
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DOI: 10.1177/1091142110367857
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References listed on IDEAS
- Sanchez, Isabel & Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 345-369, March.
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- Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Cécile Bazart & Mickael Beaud & Dimitri Dubois, 2020.
"Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency,"
Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(1), pages 47-67, February.
- Cécile Bazart & Mickael Beaud & Dimitri Dubois, 2017. "Whistleblowing vs random audit: An experimental test of relative effciency," Working Papers 17-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier.
- Cécile Bazart & Mickaël Beaud & Dimitri Dubois, 2020. "Whistleblowing vs random audit : An experimental test of relative efficiency," Post-Print halshs-02311618, HAL.
- Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen, 2016. "Voluntary Disclosure Schemes for Offshore Tax Evasion: An Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 5750, CESifo.
- Francesco Flaviano Russo, 2018. "Reporting tax evasion," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 35(3), pages 917-933, December.
- Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2020.
"Voluntary disclosure schemes for offshore tax evasion,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(4), pages 805-831, August.
- Matthew D. Rablen & Matthew Gould, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure schemes for offshore tax evasion," IFS Working Papers W18/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2019. "Voluntary Disclosure Schemes for Offshore Tax Evasion," Working Papers 2019006, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
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Keywords
tax evasion; whistle-blowers; tax agency; audit design;All these keywords.
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