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The Private Provision of Public Goods: a Perspective on Neutrality

Author

Listed:
  • Todd Sandler

    (Iowa State University)

  • John Posnett

    (University of York)

Abstract

This article has two purposes. First, the bounds of the neutrality theorem for the private provision of public goods are more firmly established The focus is on the non-neutrality of non-Nash equilibria in which nonzero conjectures depend on the agent's own contribution. The non-neutrality of equilibria involving general externalities, nonlinear constraints, and joint products are also examined Second, it is argued that non-Nash behavior and joint products, induced by institutional design, may be behind the contribution patterns reported by some researchers who investigate charities.

Suggested Citation

  • Todd Sandler & John Posnett, 1991. "The Private Provision of Public Goods: a Perspective on Neutrality," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(1), pages 22-42, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:19:y:1991:i:1:p:22-42
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219101900102
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    9. repec:bla:econom:v:54:y:1987:i:213:p:1-19 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

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    2. Nathan Rive & Dirk Rübbelke, 2010. "International environmental policy and poverty alleviation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 146(3), pages 515-543, September.
    3. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Shimomura, Koji, 2001. "A dynamic conjectural variations model in the private provision of public goods: a differential game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 153-172, July.
    4. Wolfgang Buchholz & Todd Sandler, 2017. "Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision: Incorporating Behavioural Approaches," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 591-607, July.
    5. Todd Sandler, 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 446-483, September.
    6. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2001. "Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 423-447, September.
    7. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, 1994. "Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 119-140, December.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2002:i:1:p:1-14 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Dennis A. Kaufman, 1994. "Welfare and the Private Provision of Public Goods When Altruism Increases," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(2), pages 239-257, April.
    10. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2011. "Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 639-645, August.
    11. Jun–ichi Itaya & Makoto Okamura, 2003. "Conjectural Variations and Voluntary Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 51-66, January.
    12. Huseyin Yildirim & Alvaro Name Correa, 2011. "A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000222, David K. Levine.
    13. Dennis Coates, 1996. "A Diagrammatic Demonstration of Public Crowding-Out of Private Contributions to Public Goods," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(1), pages 49-58, January.
    14. Karen Smith Conway, 1994. "Reconsidering the Effects of Fiscal Policy On Private Sector Behavior: a Unifying View of Neutrality," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(2), pages 195-221, April.
    15. Todd Sandler, 2015. "Collective action: fifty years later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 195-216, September.

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