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Explaining Challengers' Campaign Expenditures: the Importance of Sunk Nontransferable Brand Name

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  • John R. Lott JR

    (United States Sentencing Commission)

Abstract

This article will (1) respecify existing empirical work on sunk nontransferable investments in terms of Jacobsen's work on campaign expenditures, (2) control for the effect of past political brand name possessed by the challenger on entry barriers, and (3) discuss the theoretical difference between the long-run and short-run effects of campaign expenditure limit laws. Considerations for the ideal form of campaign expenditure limit laws will also be discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • John R. Lott JR, 1989. "Explaining Challengers' Campaign Expenditures: the Importance of Sunk Nontransferable Brand Name," Public Finance Review, , vol. 17(1), pages 108-118, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:17:y:1989:i:1:p:108-118
    DOI: 10.1177/109114218901700106
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nelson, Phillip, 1976. "Political Information," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 315-336, August.
    2. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    3. William Welch, 1974. "The economics of campaign funds," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 83-97, December.
    4. John Lott, 1986. "Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 87-92, January.
    5. R. Johnston, 1978. "Campaign spending and votes: a reconsideration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 83-92, January.
    6. Gertrud Fremling & John Lott, 1988. "Televising legislatures: Some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 73-78, July.
    7. Lott, John R, Jr, 1987. "Licensing and Nontransferable Rents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 453-455, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Milyo, Jeffrey & Groseclose, Timothy, 1999. "The Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 699-722, October.
    2. Filip Palda, 2001. "Election Finance Regulation in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Canada and the U.S," Public Economics 0111010, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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