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Tax Structure and Bureaucratic Bargaining

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  • William J. Hunter

    (Marquette University)

Abstract

This article explores some limitations on the power of the public bureaucracies to control public sector budgets. Two conditions are considered within a majority rule election framework. First, individuals may react to the potential loss of income resulting from a bureaucratically chosen output of public goods. Second, bureaucratic control of the public budget is constrained by the existing tax structure. The model demonstrates that the bureaucratic ability to set public expenditure levels has been seriously overestimated. Further, the model raises questions as to the role of the median voter in elections when the agenda is controlled by a public bureaucracy.

Suggested Citation

  • William J. Hunter, 1983. "Tax Structure and Bureaucratic Bargaining," Public Finance Review, , vol. 11(3), pages 347-364, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:11:y:1983:i:3:p:347-364
    DOI: 10.1177/109114218301100305
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October.
    2. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, September.
    3. James Buchanan, 1971. "Principles of urban fiscal strategy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-16, September.
    4. Lee, Dwight R, 1977. "Discrimination and Efficiency in the Pricing of Public Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 403-420, October.
    5. Howard R. Bowen, 1943. "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 58(1), pages 27-48.
    6. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    7. Denzau, Arthur T & Mackay, Robert J, 1976. "Benefit Shares and Majority Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 69-76, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Logan & J. O'Brien, 1989. "Fiscal illusion, budget maximizers, and dynamic equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 221-235, December.

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