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Natural resources and government responsiveness

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  • David Wiens

Abstract

Pogge (2008) and Wenar (2008) have recently argued that we are responsible for the persistence of the so-called ‘resource curse’. But their analyses are limited in important ways. I trace these limitations to their undue focus on the ways in which the international rules governing resource transactions undermine government accountability. To overcome the shortcomings of Pogge’s and Wenar’s analyses, I propose a normative framework organized around the social value of government responsiveness and discuss the implications of adopting this framework for future normative assessment of the resource curse and our relationships to it.

Suggested Citation

  • David Wiens, 2015. "Natural resources and government responsiveness," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 14(1), pages 84-105, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:14:y:2015:i:1:p:84-105
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X13496755
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    References listed on IDEAS

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