IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/pophec/v12y2013i2p156-178.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic theories of democratic legitimacy and the normative role of an ideal consensus

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher S. King

Abstract

Economic theories of democratic legitimacy (discussed here as minimalist theories) have criticized deliberative accounts of democratic legitimacy on the grounds that they do not represent a practical possibility and that they create conditions that make actual democracies worse. It is not simply that they represent the wrong ideal. Rather, they are too idealistic – failing to show proper regard for the cognitive and moral limitations of persons and the depth of disagreement in democratic society. This article aims to show (1) that the minimalist criterion of democratic legitimacy is self-defeating and (2) that even if there are minimal cognitive, moral, and social requirements for the possibility of practicable deliberative democracy, these limitations do not necessarily impose insuperable barriers for democratic deliberation as the normative basis of democratic legitimacy. Thus, the limiting facts do not dictate the structure of appropriate normative models of democracy in the way minimalists have supposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher S. King, 2013. "Economic theories of democratic legitimacy and the normative role of an ideal consensus," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 12(2), pages 156-178, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:12:y:2013:i:2:p:156-178
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X12460636
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1470594X12460636
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1470594X12460636?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elert, Niklas & Henrekson, Magnus, 2017. "Entrepreneurship and Institutions: A Bidirectional Relationship," Working Paper Series 1153, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 05 May 2017.
    2. Natalia Mishagina & Claude Montmarquette, 2018. "The Demand for Economic Policies, Beliefs, and Willingness-to-Pay: The Case of the Minimum Wage Policy in Quebec," CIRANO Project Reports 2018rp-14, CIRANO.
    3. Shayo, Moses & Harel, Alon, 2012. "Non-consequentialist voting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 299-313.
    4. Theiss Bendixen, 2020. "How cultural evolution can inform the science of science communication—and vice versa," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(1), pages 1-10, December.
    5. Micael Castanheira & Gaëtan Nicodème & Paola Profeta, 2012. "On the political economics of tax reforms: survey and empirical assessment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 598-624, August.
    6. Potrafke, Niklas & Fischer, Mira & Ursprung, Heinrich, 2013. "Does the Field of Study Influence Students' Political Attitudes?," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79934, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Kirchgässner, Gebhard, 2012. "Sanfter Paternalismus, meritorische Güter, und der normative Individualismus," Economics Working Paper Series 1217, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    8. Alexander William Salter, 2016. "Post-Cameralist Governance: Towards a Robust Political Economy of Bureaucracy," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 294-308, October.
    9. Peters B., 2009. "The Two Futures of Governing: Decentering and Recentering Processes in Governing," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 2(1), pages 7-24, July.
    10. Dwight R. Lee & J. R. Clark, 2018. "Can behavioral economists improve economic rationality?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 23-40, January.
    11. Mark C. Schug & Dwight R. Lee, 2012. "Why Economic Education Is Dangerous for Politicians," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 28(Fall 2012), pages 47-60.
    12. repec:wly:soecon:v:80:4:y:2014:p:926-937 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Lergetporer, Philipp & Woessmann, Ludger, 2023. "Earnings information and public preferences for university tuition: Evidence from representative experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    14. Petrik Runst, 2014. "Popular Attitudes Toward Market Economic Principles and Institutional Reform in Transition Economies," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 72(1), pages 83-115, March.
    15. Jan-Oliver Menz, 2010. "Uncertainty, social norms and consumption theory: Post and New Keynesian approaches," European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 125-146.
    16. Seung-Whan Choi & Shali Luo, 2013. "Economic Sanctions, Poverty, and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(2), pages 217-245, April.
    17. Gaudeul, Alexia & Keser, Claudia, 2017. "The social preferences of democratically elected decision makers and the conflict between wealth generation and distribution," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 327, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    18. Leonardo Baggiani & Enrico Colombatto, 2017. "Feasible taxation in advanced democracies," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(3), pages 213-229, September.
    19. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Erik Eyster, 2018. "The Demand for Bad Policy when Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(2), pages 964-998.
    20. Jan Schnellenbach, 2015. "Does classical liberalism imply an evolutionary approach to policy-making?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 53-70, April.
    21. Pavel Yakovlev, 2007. "Ideology, Shirking, and the Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. House of Representatives," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(33), pages 1-6.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:12:y:2013:i:2:p:156-178. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.