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Contractarian ethics and Harsanyi’s two justifications of utilitarianism

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  • Michael Moehler

    (Virginia Tech, USA)

Abstract

Harsanyi defends utilitarianism by means of an axiomatic proof and by what he calls the ‘equiprobability model’. Both justifications of utilitarianism aim to show that utilitarian ethics can be derived from Bayesian rationality and some weak moral constraints on the reasoning of rational agents. I argue that, from the perspective of Bayesian agents, one of these constraints, the impersonality constraint, is not weak at all if its meaning is made precise and that generally it even contradicts individual rational agency. Without the impersonality constraint, Harsanyi’s two justifications of utilitarianism on the grounds of Bayesian rationality fail. As an alternative, I develop a contractarian framework that is compatible with individual rational agency and Harsanyi’s central assumptions, and that allows the derivation of moral conclusions on the grounds of Bayesian rationality. The developed framework offers a novel justification of contractarian ethics and may best be described as a combined version of Harsanyi’s equiprobability model and Rawls’s original position.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Moehler, 2013. "Contractarian ethics and Harsanyi’s two justifications of utilitarianism," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 12(1), pages 24-47, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pophec:v:12:y:2013:i:1:p:24-47
    DOI: 10.1177/1470594X12460639
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    References listed on IDEAS

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