The game-theoretic model and experimental investigation of cyber wargaming

We demonstrate that game-theoretic calculations serve as a useful tool for assisting cyber wargaming teams in identifying effective strategies. We note a significant similarity between formulating cyber wargaming strategies and the methodology known in the military practice as Course of Action (COA) generation. For scenarios in which the attacker must penetrate multiple layers in a defense-in-depth security configuration, an accounting of attacker and defender costs and penetration probabilities provides cost–utility payoff matrices and penetration probability matrices. These can be used as decision tools by both the defender and attacker. Inspection of the matrices allows players to deduce preferred strategies (COAs) based on game-theoretical equilibrium solutions. The matrices also help in analyzing the anticipated effects of potential human-based choices of wargame strategies and counter-strategies. We describe a mathematical game-theoretic formalism and offer detailed analysis of a cyber-physical table-top wargame executed at the US Army Research Laboratory. Our analysis shows how game-theoretical calculations can indeed provide a useful tool for effective decision-making during cyber wargames.