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Common Property, Collective Action and Community

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  • Sara Singleton
  • Michael Taylor

Abstract

We are interested in explaining why some groups of users of common property are able to resolve their collective action problems by themselves and others not. Our argument is that a group possesses the capacities for a wholly endogenous solution to the degree that it approximates a community of mutually vulnerable actors. For an initial test, we reanalyze the cases studied by Elinor Ostrom in her recent book, Governing the Commons (Ostrom, 1990), in which the central role of community is (we believe) obscured.

Suggested Citation

  • Sara Singleton & Michael Taylor, 1992. "Common Property, Collective Action and Community," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 309-324, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:309-324
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692892004003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-162, April.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Berkes, Fikret, 1986. "Local-level management and the commons problem , : A comparative study of Turkish coastal fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 215-229, July.
    4. Heckathorn, Douglas D & Maser, Steven M, 1987. "Bargaining and the," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 69-98, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Husain, Zakir & Bhattacharya, Rabindra N., 2004. "Common pool resources and contextual factors: Evolution of a fishermen's cooperative in Calcutta," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3-4), pages 201-217, October.
    2. Falk, Thomas & Kumar, Shalander & Srigiri, Srinivasa, 2019. "Experimental games for developing institutional capacity to manage common water infrastructure in India," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 260-269.
    3. Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry Van Bastelar, 2002. "Understanding and Measuring Social Capital : A Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14098.
    4. Rana, Pushpendra & Chhatre, Ashwini, 2017. "Beyond committees: Hybrid forest governance for equity and sustainability," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 40-50.
    5. Christos J. Paraskevopoulos, 2007. "Social Capital and Public Policy in Greece," GreeSE – Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 09, Hellenic Observatory, LSE.

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