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Externalities From Roaming Livestock: Explaining The Demise Of The Open Range

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  • Centner, Terence J.
  • Griffin, Ronald C.

Abstract

Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause.

Suggested Citation

  • Centner, Terence J. & Griffin, Ronald C., 1998. "Externalities From Roaming Livestock: Explaining The Demise Of The Open Range," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 23(01), pages 1-14, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:31183
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Centner, Terence J., 1997. "Reforming Outdated Fence Law Provisions: Good Fences Make Good Neighbors Only If They Are Fair," Faculty Series 16688, University of Georgia, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
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    Keywords

    Livestock Production/Industries;

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