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Social Power and Non-cooperative Game Theory

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  • William Bosworth,

Abstract

This paper defends the use of non-cooperative game theory for analysing questions of governance. To do so it posits a way of extending the resource account of social power from cooperative games to noncooperative games in a way that side steps a range of criticism. This involves identifying tipping points in the reputations of certain agents for paying and punishing those in their thrall. These tipping points are what give threats and offers their credibility in the absence of enforcement mechanisms and stabilise the distribution of social resources in society.

Suggested Citation

  • William Bosworth,, 2022. "Social Power and Non-cooperative Game Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 262-279, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:34:y:2022:i:2:p:262-279
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298221081810
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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    3. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    5. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    6. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hui Chen & Guanghui Fu & Huiqin Wu & Yao Xiao & Xuan Nie & Wenjin Zhao, 2024. "Sustainable Collaboration and Incentive Policies for the Integration of Professional Education and Innovation and Entrepreneurship Education (IPEIEE)," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(17), pages 1-24, August.

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