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Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems

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  • CUSACK, THOMAS
  • IVERSEN, TORBEN
  • SOSKICE, DAVID

Abstract

Protocorporatist West European countries in which economic interests were collectively organized adopted PR in the first quarter of the twentieth century, whereas liberal countries in which economic interests were not collectively organized did not. Political parties, as Marcus Kreuzer points out, choose electoral systems. So how do economic interests translate into party political incentives to adopt electoral reform? We argue that parties in protocorporatist countries were “representative” of and closely linked to economic interests. As electoral competition in single member districts increased sharply up to World War I, great difficulties resulted for the representative parties whose leaders were seen as interest committed. They could not credibly compete for votes outside their interest without leadership changes or reductions in interest influence. Proportional representation offered an obvious solution, allowing parties to target their own voters and their organized interest to continue effective influence in the legislature. In each respect, the opposite was true of liberal countries. Data on party preferences strongly confirm this model. (Kreuzer's historical criticisms are largely incorrect, as shown in detail in the online supplementary Appendix.)

Suggested Citation

  • Cusack, Thomas & Iversen, Torben & Soskice, David, 2010. "Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 393-403, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:104:y:2010:i:02:p:393-403_00
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    Cited by:

    1. François Facchini & Mickael Melki, 2014. "Political Ideology And Economic Growth: Evidence From The French Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(4), pages 1408-1426, October.
    2. Isa Camyar & Bahar Ulupinar, 2019. "Electoral systems and the economy: a firm-level analysis," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 1-30, March.
    3. Christian Walter Martin & Nils D. Steiner, 2016. "Economic globalization and the change of electoral rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 355-376, December.
    4. Carol Mershon, 2020. "Challenging the wisdom on preferential proportional representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(1), pages 168-182, January.
    5. Peter John, 2018. "Theories of policy change and variation reconsidered: a prospectus for the political economy of public policy," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 51(1), pages 1-16, March.
    6. Yeung, Timothy Yu-Cheong, 2017. "Political philosophy, executive constraint and electoral rules," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 67-88.
    7. James Wood & Engelbert Stockhammer, 2020. "House prices, private debt and the macroeconomics of comparative political economy," Working Papers PKWP2005, Post Keynesian Economics Society (PKES).
    8. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847.
    9. Santucci, Jack, 2017. "Bad for Party Discipline: Why Unions Attacked the Single Transferable Vote in Cincinnati," SocArXiv aqn5y, Center for Open Science.

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