IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v31y2019i4p543-567.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The design of enforcement: Collective action and the enforcement of international law

Author

Listed:
  • Leslie Johns

Abstract

International organizations (IOs) play a vital role in enforcing international law. I argue that collective-action problems and the design of legal-standing rules drive decisions about whether to enforce international law. When cooperation generates concentrated benefits—such as compensation for the expropriation of foreign investment—transnational standing can work well because the cost and benefit of enforcement are both fully internalized by the litigant. However, when cooperation generates diffuse benefits—like a cleaner environment—individuals and even governments have the incentive to free ride on enforcement, avoiding the cost of litigation in the hopes that another actor will step up. In such circumstances, supranational standing is necessary to uphold international law. Finally, hybrid regimes, which contain multiple forms of enforcement, are most needed when an IO has members that vary in their ability to enforce, or regulates issue areas that vary in their diffuseness.

Suggested Citation

  • Leslie Johns, 2019. "The design of enforcement: Collective action and the enforcement of international law," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 543-567, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:31:y:2019:i:4:p:543-567
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875514
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629819875514
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951629819875514?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Goldstein, Judith & Kahler, Miles & Keohane, Robert O. & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 2000. "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 385-399, July.
    2. Schill,Stephan W., 2014. "The Multilateralization of International Investment Law," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107636507, October.
    3. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
    4. Allee, Todd & Peinhardt, Clint, 2011. "Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 401-432, July.
    5. Noel Maurer, 2013. "The Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to Protect American Property Overseas, 1893-2012," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9952.
    6. Staton, Jeffrey K. & Moore, Will H., 2011. "Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 553-587, July.
    7. Abbott, Kenneth W. & Green, Jessica F. & Keohane, Robert O., 2016. "Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 247-277, April.
    8. Abbott, Kenneth W. & Keohane, Robert O. & Moravcsik, Andrew & Slaughter, Anne-Marie & Snidal, Duncan, 2000. "The Concept of Legalization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 401-419, July.
    9. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 761-799, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Oliver Westerwinter & Kenneth W. Abbott & Thomas Biersteker, 2021. "Informal governance in world politics," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-27, January.
    2. Adela Toscano-Valle & Antonio Sianes & Francisco Santos-Carrillo & Luis A. Fernández-Portillo, 2022. "Can the Rational Design of International Institutions Solve Cooperation Problems? Insights from a Systematic Literature Review," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(13), pages 1-22, June.
    3. Barbara Koremenos, 2007. "If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 189-212, January.
    4. Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, 2016. "Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? New evidence from preferential trade agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-120, March.
    5. Oliver Westerwinter, 2017. "Barbara Koremenos. 2016. The continent of international law. Explaining agreement design. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 647-651, December.
    6. Liesbet Hooghe & Tobias Lenz & Gary Marks, 2019. "Contested world order: The delegitimation of international governance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 731-743, December.
    7. Fabio Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, 2021. "Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 591-610, December.
    8. Oliver Westerwinter, 2015. "Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel and Jan Wouters (Eds.). 2012. Informal international lawmaking. (Oxford: Oxford University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March.
    9. Maria J. Debre & Hylke Dijkstra, 2023. "Are international organisations in decline? An absolute and relative perspective on institutional change," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 14(1), pages 16-30, February.
    10. Daniel J. Blake & Caterina Moschieri, 2017. "Policy risk, strategic decisions and contagion effects: Firm‐specific considerations," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 732-750, March.
    11. Jessica F. Green, 2018. "Transnational delegation in global environmental governance: When do non‐state actors govern?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(2), pages 263-276, June.
    12. Lee, Jiwon & Wittgenstein, Teresa, 2017. "Weak vs. Strong Ties: Explaining Early Settlement in WTO Disputes," ILE Working Paper Series 7, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    13. Lara Merling & Timon Forster, 2024. "Climate policy at the International Monetary Fund: No voice for the vulnerable?," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 15(3), pages 539-553, June.
    14. Jillienne Haglund & Courtney Hillebrecht, 2020. "Overlapping international human rights institutions: Introducing the Women’s Rights Recommendations Digital Database (WR2D2)," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(5), pages 648-657, September.
    15. Tobias Lenz & Besir Ceka & Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks & Alexandr Burilkov, 2023. "Discovering cooperation: Endogenous change in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 631-666, October.
    16. James Hollway & Jean-Frédéric Morin & Joost Pauwelyn, 2020. "Structural conditions for novelty: the introduction of new environmental clauses to the trade regime complex," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 61-83, March.
    17. Markus Gastinger & Henning Schmidtke, 2023. "Measuring precision precisely: A dictionary-based measure of imprecision," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 553-571, July.
    18. Brent B Allred & Michael G Findley & Daniel Nielson & J C Sharman, 2017. "Anonymous shell companies: A global audit study and field experiment in 176 countries," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 48(5), pages 596-619, July.
    19. Lin Cui & Chungshik Moon, 2020. "What attracts foreign direct investment into autocratic states? Regime time horizon and institutional design," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(10), pages 2762-2784, October.
    20. Simon Schropp, Kornel Mahlstein, 2007. "The Optimal Design of Trade Policy Flexibility in the WTO," IHEID Working Papers 27-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Dec 2007.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:31:y:2019:i:4:p:543-567. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.