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Partisan strength and legislative bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Choate

    (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, USA)

  • John A Weymark

    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, USA)

  • Alan E Wiseman

    (Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA)

Abstract

We extend the canonical Baron–Ferejohn model of majoritarian legislative bargaining in order to analyze the effects of partisanship on bargaining outcomes. We consider three legislators, two of whom are party affiliated, with each partisan placing some value on the share of the dollar obtained by his copartisan in addition to his own share. We characterize the equilibrium of our model as a function of the strength of party affiliation and the degree to which the legislators have concern for the future; and we determine how the equilibrium varies in response to changes in these two parameters. We show how partisanship advantages the affiliated legislators relative to the nonpartisan and identify the circumstances in which a majority party legislator proposes a bipartisan outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Choate & John A Weymark & Alan E Wiseman, 2019. "Partisan strength and legislative bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(1), pages 6-45, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:31:y:2019:i:1:p:6-45
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629818809416
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Maria Montero, 2007. "Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(519), pages 192-204, March.
    3. Randall L. Calvert & Nathan Dietz, 2005. "Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: David Austen-Smith & John Duggan (ed.), Social Choice and Strategic Decisions, pages 227-247, Springer.
    4. Kriner,Douglas L. & Reeves,Andrew, 2015. "The Particularistic President," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107616813, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kärnä, Anders & Meriläinen, Jaakko & Norell, John, 2024. "The Price of Exclusion: Coalition Formation in the Shadow of Rising Radical Right," Working Paper Series 1507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Thomas Choate & John A Weymark & Alan E Wiseman, 2020. "Legislative bargaining and partisan delegation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 289-311, April.

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