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Electoral geography and redistributive politics

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  • Karen L Jusko

Abstract

This paper offers a new electoral geography perspective on two stylized facts that do not fit easily with our current understanding of the implications of electoral rules for electoral politics and social policy: (1) proportional representation (PR) electoral rules are not always associated with more generous social spending. In some cases, we observe comparatively high levels of social spending in majoritarian single-member district (SMD) systems. (2) Contrary to our theoretical expectations, national two-party competition occurs rarely, even under SMD rules. Here, I demonstrate the importance of electoral geography through a series of analytic examples that are based on a simple model of electoral politics, and in which all possible combinations of electoral boundaries, rules, and voter locations are manipulated.

Suggested Citation

  • Karen L Jusko, 2015. "Electoral geography and redistributive politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 269-287, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:27:y:2015:i:2:p:269-287
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629814521514
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    References listed on IDEAS

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