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Narrow versus broad judicial decisions

Author

Listed:
  • Justin Fox

    (Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, USA)

  • Georg Vanberg

    (Department of Political Science, Duke University, USA)

Abstract

A central debate among judges and legal scholars concerns the appropriate scope of judicial opinions: should decisions be narrow, and stick to the facts at hand, or should they be broad, and provide guidance in related contexts? A central argument for judicial ‘minimalism’ holds that judges should rule narrowly because they lack the knowledge required to make general rules to govern unknown future circumstances. In this paper, we challenge this argument. Our argument focuses on the fact that, by shaping the legal landscape, judicial decisions affect the policies that are adopted, and that may therefore subsequently be challenged before the court. Using a simple model, we demonstrate that in such a dynamic setting, in which current decisions shape future cases, judges with limited knowledge confront incentives to rule broadly precisely because they are ignorant.

Suggested Citation

  • Justin Fox & Georg Vanberg, 2014. "Narrow versus broad judicial decisions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(3), pages 355-383, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:3:p:355-383
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629813502709
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    9. Anthony Niblett, 2013. "Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 303-330.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan, 2018. "Learning While Setting Precedents," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1810, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    2. Howell, William & Shepsle, Kenneth & Wolton, Stephane, 2020. "Executive Absolutism: A Model," MPRA Paper 98221, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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