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Supermajority voting, social indifference and status quo constraints

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  • Reuben Kline

Abstract

We develop several results related to equilibrium in sophisticated voting under an amendment agenda procedure and supermajoritarian voting rules. Contrary to the simple majority case, we demonstrate that attainable equilibria are a function of the location of the status quo ex ante as well as the tie-breaking rule in place. Most importantly, we demonstrate that the Banks set (the set of sophisticated voting outcomes) does not reduce to the core under certain conditions. Moreover, in generalizing and extending the results in Colomer (1999), we define three analytically distinct regions, defined by the location of the status quo alternative, which determine the extent of the intersection between the Banks set and the core.

Suggested Citation

  • Reuben Kline, 2014. "Supermajority voting, social indifference and status quo constraints," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(2), pages 312-330, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:2:p:312-330
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629813505725
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Le Breton, 2004. "Equilibrium agenda formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 21-57, August.
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    6. Georges Bordes & Michel Le Breton & Maurice Salles, 1992. "Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 509-518, August.
    7. Schofield, Norman & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L., 1988. "The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 195-211, March.
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