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Groseclose and Snyder in finite legislatures

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  • Christian Dippel

Abstract

The Groseclose and Snyder (1996) model is one of the best-known models of vote buying in legislatures. Although the logic of the model is compelling, it is not clear that its key propositions, derived in a continuous set-up, hold in finite legislatures. This is an important issue because many real-world legislatures are small and should be modeled as finite in order to make predictions on coalition formation in them. This paper makes two contributions. The main one is to show with full generality that the key propositions in the Groseclose and Snyder model do carry through into finite legislatures. Secondly, it clarifies the role that parameter restrictions played in previous work on this question by Banks (2000) which was not fully general.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Dippel, 2012. "Groseclose and Snyder in finite legislatures," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 265-273, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:24:y:2012:i:2:p:265-273
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629811423092
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-327, March.
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