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Navigating the Legislative Divide

Author

Listed:
  • Matthew N. Beckmann

    (Department of Political Science & Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697, USA, beckmann@uci.edu)

  • Anthony J. McGann

    (Department of Political Science & Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697, USA, amcgann@uci.edu)

Abstract

Polarization hallmarks contemporary Washington's political landscape. While an increasing literature examines the factors propelling this schism, theoretical work investigating its consequences has just begun. Building from a simple bargaining model in which an exogenous actor (e.g. the president) strategically allocates scarce `political capital' to induce changes in legislators' preferences, we examine how varying the chamber's preference distribution affects the policies that result. Instead of miring presidents' preferred policies in gridlock, the model shows that ideological polarization — in the form of a bimodal distribution — can actually enable a president to pass policies closer to his ideal than would have been possible under greater ideological homogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew N. Beckmann & Anthony J. McGann, 2008. "Navigating the Legislative Divide," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 201-220, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:2:p:201-220
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629807085818
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    References listed on IDEAS

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