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Hit by Pitches

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  • Gregory A. Trandel

Abstract

It is commonly believed that baseball teams retaliate when one of their batters is hit by a pitch. In fact, Major League Baseball (MLB) has legislated to discourage this behavior. Previous analysts have disagreed about whether retaliation is likely directed at the offending pitcher or at one of his teammates; this distinction matters when considering impacts on pitcher behavior. This paper notes that when season-long hit-by-pitch totals—the data used to date — are disaggregated by team, they reveal no evidence of either formof retaliation. These researching this topic may need to develop new data sources.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory A. Trandel, 2004. "Hit by Pitches," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 5(1), pages 87-92, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:5:y:2004:i:1:p:87-92
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002503257247
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    2. Trandel, Gregory A & White, Lawrence H & Klein, Peter G, 1998. "The Effect of the Designated Hitter Rule on Hit Batsmen: Pitcher's Moral Hazard or the Team's Cost-Benefit Calculation? A Comment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 679-684, October.
    3. Goff, Brian L & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1997. "Batter Up! Moral Hazard and the Effects of the Designated Hitter Rule on Hit Batsmen," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 555-561, July.
    4. Levitt, Steven D, 1998. "The Hazards of Moral Hazard: Comment on Goff, Shughart, and Tollison," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 685-687, October.
    5. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation," International Economic Association Series, in: L.-A. Gérard-Varet & S.-C. Kolm & J. Mercier Ythier (ed.), The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, chapter 7, pages 153-173, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Lawrence M. Kahn, 2000. "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 75-94, Summer.
    7. Goff, Brian L & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1998. "Moral Hazard and the Effects of the Designated Hitter Rule Revisited," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 688-692, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Charles Bradbury & Douglas Drinen, 2006. "Research Notes: The Designated Hitter, Moral Hazard, and Hit Batters," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 7(3), pages 319-329, August.
    2. Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner J. La Croix, 2007. "The Designated Hitter Rule and Team Defensive Strategy in Japan's Professional Baseball Leagues," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(5), pages 491-504, October.
    3. Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner La Croix, 2010. "The Designated Hitter Rule in Baseball as a Natural Experiment," Working Papers 201005, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    4. Akihiko Kawaura, 2010. "Designated Hitter Rule Debate: A Search for Mr. Hyde in Pitchers," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(3), pages 349-357, June.
    5. John Charles Bradbury & Douglas J. Drinen, 2007. "Crime And Punishment In Major League Baseball: The Case Of The Designated Hitter And Hit Batters," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 131-144, January.
    6. Kevin Baldini & Mark T. Gillis & Matt E. Ryan, 2011. "Do Relief Pitching and Remaining Games Create Moral Hazard Problems in Major League Baseball?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(6), pages 647-659, December.

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