IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v60y2016i8p1368-1394.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

When War Helps Civil–military Relations

Author

Listed:
  • Varun Piplani
  • Caitlin Talmadge

Abstract

Coups remain a widespread and consequential political phenomenon, but it remains unclear whether interstate conflict protects leaders from the risk of coups or increases this risk. We theorize that interstate conflict—especially when it is prolonged—should protect domestic regimes from military overthrow by foreclosing many of the key pathways by which elites plot and execute coups. We test this argument using event history modeling. The evidence provides support for our claim that coup risk declines in the presence of enduring interstate conflict. Just as important, we detect no evidence that war increases coup risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Varun Piplani & Caitlin Talmadge, 2016. "When War Helps Civil–military Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(8), pages 1368-1394, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:60:y:2016:i:8:p:1368-1394
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002714567950
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002714567950
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002714567950?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brian Lai & Dan Slater, 2006. "Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(1), pages 113-126, January.
    2. Milan W. Svolik, 2013. "Contracting on Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(5), pages 765-794, October.
    3. Gabriel Leon, 2014. "Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 363-383, June.
    4. Weeks, Jessica L., 2012. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 326-347, May.
    5. Timothy Besley & James A. Robinson, 2010. "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian Control Over the Military," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 655-663, 04-05.
    6. Gabriel Leon, 2014. "Soldiers or politicians? Institutions, conflict, and the military’s role in politics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 533-556.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leon, Gabriel, 2014. "Strategic redistribution: The political economy of populism in Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 39-51.
    2. Bjørnskov, Christian & Pfaff, Katharina, 2021. "Differences matter: The effect of coup types on physical integrity rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    3. Oasis Kodila-Tedika & Sherif Khalifa, 2021. "African Junta and Defence Spending: A Capture Effect or Self-preservation? [A Theory of Military Dictatorships]," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 30(3), pages 285-300.
    4. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2023. "The economic effects of international sanctions: An event study," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 1214-1231.
    5. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2015. "Regime spoiler or regime pawn: The military and distributional conflict in non-democracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 491-502.
    6. Vincenzo Bove & Roberto Nisticò, 2014. "Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 321-344, December.
    7. Aney, Madhav S. & Ko, Giovanni, 2015. "Expropriation risk and competition within the military," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 125-149.
    8. Andrew T. Little, 2017. "Coordination, Learning, and Coups," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(1), pages 204-234, January.
    9. Antonis Adam & Petros G. Sekeris, 2017. "Self-Containment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(1), pages 173-203, January.
    10. Emmanuelle Auriol & Jean-Philippe Platteau & Thierry Verdier, 2023. "The Quran and the Sword," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1772-1820.
    11. Matthew Wilson & Carla Martinez Machain, 2018. "Militarism and Dual-Conflict Capacity," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(1), pages 156-172, January.
    12. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Verdier, Thierry, 2020. "The Quran and the Sword: The Strategic Game Between Autocratic Power, the Military and the Clerics," CEPR Discussion Papers 14712, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Daehee Bak, 2020. "Autocratic political cycle and international conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 259-279, May.
    14. Bove, Vincenzo & Nisticò, Roberto, 2014. "Military in politics and budgetary allocations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 1065-1078.
    15. Randolph M Siverson & Richard AI Johnson, 2018. "Trigger-happy? Military regimes and the timing of conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(5), pages 544-558, September.
    16. Christian Bjørnskov & Stefan Voigt, 2022. "Terrorism and emergency constitutions in the Muslim world," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(3), pages 305-318, May.
    17. Nam Kyu Kim, 2018. "Are Military Regimes Really Belligerent?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(6), pages 1151-1178, July.
    18. Balima, Hippolyte Weneyam, 2020. "Coups d’état and the cost of debt," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 509-528.
    19. Martin Gassebner & Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2016. "When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 293-313, December.
    20. Raul Caruso & Jacopo Costa & Roberto Ricciuti, 2011. "The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007," Working Papers 2011/26, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:60:y:2016:i:8:p:1368-1394. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.