IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v52y2008i2p213-242.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Power or Plenty

Author

Listed:
  • Emilie M. Hafner-Burton

    (Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs Department of Politics Princeton University)

  • Alexander H. Montgomery

    (Department of Political Science Reed College)

Abstract

Does the dramatic rise of the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) worldwide make economic sanctions more likely through increasing the leverage of the powerful and pitting states against each other in competition (power) or less likely through increasing the benefits of trade, resolving disputes, and promoting like-minded communities (plenty)? The authors offer the first systematic test of these propositions, testing hypotheses on sanctions onset using a data set of episodes from 1947 through 2000. In favor of the plenty argument, increases in bilateral trade do decrease sanctioning behavior; in favor of the power argument, an increase in the potential sanctioner's GDP or centrality in the network of all PTAs make sanctioning much more likely. However, mutual membership in PTAs has no direct effect on the propensity of states to sanction each other.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Alexander H. Montgomery, 2008. "Power or Plenty," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(2), pages 213-242, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:52:y:2008:i:2:p:213-242
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002707313689
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002707313689
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002707313689?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pevehouse, Jon & Russett, Bruce, 2006. "Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 969-1000, October.
    2. Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 2015. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Edward D Mansfield (ed.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, chapter 7, pages 127-143, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. D. Scott Bennett & Allan C. Stam, 2000. "Eugene : A conceptual manual," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2), pages 179-204, March.
    4. Mansfield, Edward D. & Pevehouse, Jon C., 2000. "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 775-808, October.
    5. Schiff, Maurice & Winters, L Alan, 1998. "Regional Integration as Diplomacy," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 12(2), pages 271-295, May.
    6. Mansfield, Edward D. & Reinhardt, Eric, 2003. "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 829-862, October.
    7. Mansfield, Edward D. & Bronson, Rachel, 1997. "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 94-107, March.
    8. Robert W. McGee, 1998. "MFN Status, Trade Embargoes, Sanctions and Blockades: An Examination of Some Overlooked Property, Contract and Other Human Rights Issues," International Trade 9805002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Kimberly Ann Elliott & Tess Cyrus & Elizabeth Winston, 1997. "US Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages," Working Paper Series Working Paper Special (2), Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    10. Haas, Ernst B., 1961. "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 366-392, July.
    11. Smith, James McCall, 2000. "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 137-180, January.
    12. King, Gary & Zeng, Langche, 2001. "Explaining Rare Events in International Relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(3), pages 693-715, July.
    13. Maxim Engers & Jonathan Eaton, 1999. "Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 409-414, May.
    14. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, January.
    15. Barnett, Michael N. & Finnemore, Martha, 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 699-732, October.
    16. Gowa, Joanne & Mansfield, Edward D., 1993. "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 408-420, June.
    17. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    18. Fernandez, Raquel & Portes, Jonathan, 1998. "Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 12(2), pages 197-220, May.
    19. Sam Laird, 1999. "Regional Trade Agreements: Dangerous Liaisons?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(9), pages 1179-1200, December.
    20. John Whalley, 1998. "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?," NBER Chapters, in: The Regionalization of the World Economy, pages 63-90, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Snidal, Duncan, 1991. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 701-726, September.
    22. Nossal, Kim Richard, 1989. "International sanctions as international punishment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 301-322, April.
    23. King, Gary, 2001. "Proper Nouns and Methodological Propriety: Pooling Dyads in International Relations Data," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 497-507, April.
    24. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 593-629, July.
    25. Gallarotti, Giulio M., 1991. "The limits of international organization: systematic failure in the management of international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 183-220, April.
    26. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-837, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Alexander H. Montgomery, 2012. "War, Trade, and Distrust: Why Trade Agreements Don’t Always Keep the Peace," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 257-278, July.
    2. Golub Jonathan, 2020. "Improving Analyses of Sanctions Busting," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 26(2), pages 1-20, May.
    3. Aysegul Aydin, 2010. "The deterrent effects of economic integration," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(5), pages 523-533, September.
    4. Timothy M. Peterson, 2014. "Taking the cue: The response to US human rights sanctions against third parties," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 145-167, April.
    5. Andreas Dür & Leonardo Baccini & Manfred Elsig, 2014. "The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 353-375, September.
    6. Vicard, Vincent, 2012. "Trade, conflict, and political integration: Explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 54-71.
    7. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Jana von Stein & Erik Gartzke, 2008. "International Organizations Count," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(2), pages 175-188, April.
    8. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2009. "Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(5), pages 698-726, October.
    9. Baldwin, Richard & Jaimovich, Dany, 2012. "Are Free Trade Agreements contagious?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-16.
    10. Baccini, Leonardo & Dür, Andreas & Elsig, Manfred & Milewicz, Karolina, 2011. "The design of preferential trade agreements: A new dataset in the Making," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2011-10, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    11. Michelle A. Benson, 2005. "The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads in the Study of Interdependence and Dyadic Disputes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(2), pages 113-133, April.
    12. (ed.), 0. "Research Handbook on Economic Diplomacy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16053.
    13. Denise Guthrie & Erick Duchesne, 2003. "(Mis)Selection Effects and Sovereignty Costs: An Alternative Measure of the Costs of Sanctions," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20032, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    14. Fuchs, Andreas & Klann, Nils-Hendrik, 2013. "Paying a visit: The Dalai Lama effect on international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 164-177.
    15. Baldwin, Richard Edward & Rieder , Roland, 2007. "A Test of Endogenous Trade Bloc Formation Theory on EU Data," East Asian Economic Review, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, vol. 11(2), pages 77-110, December.
    16. Caruso Raul, 2003. "The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-36, April.
    17. Valentin L. Krustev & T. Clifton Morgan, 2011. "Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 351-376, September.
    18. Anna Miromanova, 2023. "The effectiveness of embargoes: Evidence from Russia," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 906-940, April.
    19. Edward D. Mansfield & Brian M. Pollins, 2001. "The Study of Interdependence and Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(6), pages 834-859, December.
    20. Susan Ariel Aaronson & M. Rodwan Abouharb & K. Daniel Wang, 2015. "The Liberal Illusion Is Not a Complete Delusion: The WTO Helps Member States Keep the Peace Only When It Increases Trade," Global Economy Journal (GEJ), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 455-484, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:52:y:2008:i:2:p:213-242. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.