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Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance

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  • BETH A. SIMMONS

    (Department of Political Science University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

Why should governments delegate decision-making authority over territorial issues to an international institution? This study argues that governments are motivated to reach territorial solutions to reduce the opportunity costs associated with a festering dispute. The evidence suggests that domestic political incapacity to negotiate concessions is associated with a commitment to arbitrate. Compliance is a function of the net costs and benefits involved in accepting the arbitral decision. These costs include the loss of valuable territory, but noncompliance also exacts costs with respect to governments' reputation, both domestically and internationally. This research speaks to a broader debate about the role of international legal institutions in foreign policy making and international outcomes. It shows that governments have good reasons, under certain political and economic conditions, to use international legal processes as a substitute for domestic political decision making.

Suggested Citation

  • Beth A. Simmons, 2002. "Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(6), pages 829-856, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:46:y:2002:i:6:p:829-856
    DOI: 10.1177/002200202237931
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin, Lisa L. & Simmons, Beth A., 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 729-757, October.
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    6. Fearon, James D., 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 577-592, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Catherine Z. Worsnop, 2017. "Domestic politics and the WHO’s International Health Regulations: Explaining the use of trade and travel barriers during disease outbreaks," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 365-395, September.

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