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Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars

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  • Caroline A. Hartzell

    (Political Science Department, Gettysburg College)

Abstract

Although the majority of civil wars end when one warring party achieves a victory over the other, negotiated agreements are growing more common as a means of ending intrastate conflict. To explain why some negotiated settlements prove stable and others do not, scholars have examined the impact of factors such as superpower conflict, group identities, and third-party guarantors. This article argues that those negotiated settlements that are the most extensively institutionalized—that is, that provide institutional guarantees for the security threats antagonists face as they move toward a situation of centralized state power—are the ones most likely to prove stable. An analysis of all settlements negotiated to end intrastate conflicts during the period between 1945 and 1997 supports this proposition.

Suggested Citation

  • Caroline A. Hartzell, 1999. "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(1), pages 3-22, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:1:p:3-22
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043001001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Crawford, Sue E. S. & Ostrom, Elinor, 1995. "A Grammar of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 582-600, September.
    2. Walter, Barbara F., 1997. "Policy Paper 31: Designing Transitions from Violent Civil War," Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper Series qt9jd8s41s, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California.
    3. Walter, Barbara F., 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 335-364, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chandra Sriram & Marie-Joëlle Zahar, 2009. "The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond," Africa Spectrum, Institute of African Affairs, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 44(3), pages 11-39.
    2. Ghassan Dibeh, 2005. "The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction in Lebanon," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2005-44, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Amos Sawyer, 2005. "Social Capital, Survival Strategies, and their Potential for Post-Conflict Governance in Liberia," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2005-15, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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