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Trust, Reputation, And Exit in Exchange Relationships

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  • Bernd Lahno

    (University of Duisburg)

Abstract

Contrary to the assumptions of the supergame model, agents in exchange situations will normally not be perfectly informed about past behavior of their partners. Moreover, they will generally be in a position to choose their partners. The formal model of this article attempts to take account of these facts. It is presupposed that, for any actor, the probability of finding a partner for an advantageous exchange depends on his or her past behavior. A model of reputation formation is presented as a formal description of this dependency. On the basis of this model, it is shown that, under certain conditions, only cooperative conduct will pay in the long run. Thus it is confirmed that, given a suitable mechanism of trust, rational agents may act trustworthy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Lahno, 1995. "Trust, Reputation, And Exit in Exchange Relationships," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(3), pages 495-510, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:3:p:495-510
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039003005
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    Cited by:

    1. Buskens, Vincent, 2003. "Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 235-252, February.
    2. Andrew Kydd, 2000. "Overcoming Mistrust," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(4), pages 397-424, November.
    3. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovič, 2011. "Building Trust—One Gift at a Time," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(4), pages 1-22, September.
    4. Giangiacomo Bravo & Lucia Tamburino, 2008. "The Evolution of Trust in Non-Simultaneous Exchange Situations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(1), pages 85-113, February.
    5. repec:aly:journl:201713 is not listed on IDEAS

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