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Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other?

Author

Listed:
  • Alex Mintz
  • Nehemia Geva

    (Texas A&M University)

Abstract

Building upon the work of Maoz and Russett, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, and Morgan and Campbell, the authors evaluate the “democratic peace†phenomenon in an experimental setting. They first introduce the “political incentive†explanation of why democracies don't fight each other in the context of the diversionary theory of war, and then report results based on experiments with three groups of subjects: American students, nonstudent adults, and Israeli students. The results of all three experiments confirm the democratic peace findings and suggest that democracies do not fight each other because their leaders have very few political incentives to do so.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Mintz & Nehemia Geva, 1993. "Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 484-503, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:37:y:1993:i:3:p:484-503
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Doyle, Michael W., 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1151-1169, December.
    2. Ostrom, Charles W. & Job, Brian L., 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 541-566, June.
    3. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
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