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Experiments with N-Person Social Traps I

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  • Anatol Rapoport

    (University College University of Toronto)

Abstract

Subjects for single play experiments with n-person social traps (strong and weak versions of Prisoner's Dilemma, Volunteer's Dilemma, Largest Number) were recruited from several populations: students, professionals, business people, employees, and foreign visitors. Performances were compared across the subject pools, across the games, and across instructions. The results indicated that subjects receiving full instructions, including warnings about the social traps, avoid the social traps more frequently than those receiving minimal instructions. However, the differences in frequencies of cooperative choices were all slight except for the strong version of Prisoner's Dilemma. Fewest cooperative choices were observed in business people, the most in foreign visitors. However, the latter effect may have been an artifact due to self-selection. Among the games, Largest Number is distinguished by possessing no individually rational equilibrium. The cooperative solution of this game, however, is salient, namely, for each to name the smallest number. In spite of this salience, the smallest frequencies of cooperative choices were observed in this game, and full instructions did not significantly increase the frequency. When the subjects had an opportunity to organize five-person cooperative groups, each of which had a good chance of winning $1000, only 30 of 60 subjects formed such groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Anatol Rapoport, 1988. "Experiments with N-Person Social Traps I," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(3), pages 457-472, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:32:y:1988:i:3:p:457-472
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002788032003003
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    Cited by:

    1. Donja Darai & Silvia Gr�tz, 2010. "Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma," SOI - Working Papers 1006, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2010.
    2. Eliseo Luis Vilalta-Perdomo & Rebecca Herron, 2018. "Individual Actions as Community Informative Resources. A Collective Informative Systems Approach," Systemic Practice and Action Research, Springer, vol. 31(6), pages 581-598, December.
    3. Bernauer, Thomas & Nguyen, Quynh, 2014. "Trust in trade: The causal role of social trust on individual trade preferences," Papers 740, World Trade Institute.
    4. Stefano Moroni, 2015. "Beni di nessuno, beni di alcuni, beni di tutti: note critiche sull?incerto paradigma dei beni comuni," SCIENZE REGIONALI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(3), pages 137-144.
    5. Wojtek Przepiorka & Andreas Diekmann, 2020. "Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-21, January.

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