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Time Pressure and the Development of Integrative Agreements in Bilateral Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Peter J.D. Carnevale

    (Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

  • Edward J. Lawler

    (Department of Sociology, University of Iowa)

Abstract

A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure on the process and outcome of integrative bargaining. Time pressure was operationalized in terms of the amount of time available to negotiate. As hypothesized, high time pressure produced nonagreements and poor negotiation outcomes only when negotiators adopted an individualistic orientation; when negotiators adopted a cooperative orientation, they achieved high outcomes regardless of time pressure. In combination with an individualistic orientation, time pressure produced greater competitiveness, firm negotiator aspirations, and reduced information exchange. In combination with a cooperative orientation, time pressure produced greater cooperativeness and lower negotiator aspirations. The main findings were seen as consistent with Pruitt's strategic-choice model of negotiation.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter J.D. Carnevale & Edward J. Lawler, 1986. "Time Pressure and the Development of Integrative Agreements in Bilateral Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(4), pages 636-659, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:30:y:1986:i:4:p:636-659
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002786030004003
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emin Karagözoglu & Martin G. Kocher, 2015. "Bargaining under Time Pressure," CESifo Working Paper Series 5685, CESifo.
    2. Michael J. Hine & Steven A. Murphy & Michael Weber & Gregory Kersten, 2009. "The Role of Emotion and Language in Dyadic E-negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 193-211, May.
    3. Ayman M. Wasfy & Yasser A. Hosni, 1998. "Two-Party Negotiation Modeling: An Integrated Fuzzy Logic Approach," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 7(6), pages 491-518, November.
    4. Emin Karagözoğlu & Martin G. Kocher, 2019. "Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 419-440, June.
    5. Shay S. Tzafrir & Rudolph Joseph Sanchez & Keren Tirosh-Unger, 2012. "Social Motives and Trust: Implications for Joint Gains in Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(6), pages 839-862, November.
    6. Anders Poulsen & Axel Sonntag, 2019. "Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    7. Thomas, Rodney W. & Esper, Terry L. & Stank, Theodore P., 2010. "Testing the Negative Effects of Time Pressure in Retail Supply Chain Relationships," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 86(4), pages 386-400.
    8. Graf, Lorenz & König, Andreas & Enders, Albrecht & Hungenberg, Harald, 2012. "Debiasing competitive irrationality: How managers can be prevented from trading off absolute for relative profit," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 386-403.
    9. Mara Olekalns & Philip L. Smith, 2018. "A Satisfied Mind: Motivational Orientation, Feedback and the Subjective Value of Negotiation Outcomes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 179-196, April.

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