IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v22y1978i4p547-564.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Transforming a Nation-Dominant International System

Author

Listed:
  • Dina A. Zinnes

    (Indiana University)

  • John V. Gillespie

    (Indiana University)

  • G. S. Tahim

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

This paper investigates the problem of system transformation. Focusing on one attribute of system structure, the distribution of power, it is shown that certain power distributions are incompatible with certain optimizing behaviors. Specifically, it is shown that if a system contains a dominant nation, a nation whose power exceeds the sum of the power of all remaining nations, and if nations optimize using stochastic inputs, then the dominant nation will lose its superiority. It is further shown, through a generalization of the argument, that the application of stochastic inputs also insures against subsystem dominance, thus providing a guarantee against “spheres of influence†by some nations over subsets of nations. The general argument is substantiated by showing that similar results can be obtained by way of two different forms of analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Dina A. Zinnes & John V. Gillespie & G. S. Tahim, 1978. "Transforming a Nation-Dominant International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(4), pages 547-564, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:22:y:1978:i:4:p:547-564
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277802200401
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200277802200401
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/002200277802200401?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. M. Simaan & J. B. Cruz, Jr., 1975. "Nash Equilibrium Strategies for the Problem of Armament Race and Control," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(1), pages 96-105, September.
    2. Gillespie, John V. & Zinnes, Dina A. & Tahim, G.S. & Schrodt, Philip A. & Rubison, R. Michael, 1977. "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 226-244, March.
    3. Brito, D L, 1972. "A Dynamic Model of an Armaments Race," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(2), pages 359-375, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael D. Intriligator, 1982. "Research on Conflict Theory," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(2), pages 307-327, June.
    2. Charles H. Anderton, 1989. "Arms Race Modeling," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(2), pages 346-367, June.
    3. Michael D. McGinnis, 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(3), pages 443-473, September.
    4. Kendall D. Moll & Gregory M. Luebbert, 1980. "Arms Race and Military Expenditure Models," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 153-185, March.
    5. Michael P. Leidy & Robert W. Staiger, 1985. "Economic Issues and Methodology in Arms Race Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 503-530, September.
    6. Robert H. Kupperman & Harvey A. Smith, 1976. "Formal Models of Arms Races: Discussion," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(1), pages 89-96, February.
    7. van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 1987. "Conflict over arms accumulation in market and command economies," Research Memorandum FEW 265, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Devi Prasad DASH & Debi Prasad BAL & Manoranjan SAHOO, 2016. "Nexus between defense expenditure and economic growth in BRIC economies: An empirical investigation," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(1(606), S), pages 89-102, Spring.
    9. Juan M. C. Larrosa, 2016. "Arms build-up and arms race in optimal economic growth," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 167-182, June.
    10. Jean-Christian Lambelet & Urs Luterbacher & Pierre Allan, 1979. "Dynamics of Arms Races: Mutual Stimulation vs. Self-Stimulation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 4(1), pages 49-66, February.
    11. Michael Ben-Gad & Yakov Ben-Haim & Dan Peled, 2020. "Allocating Security Expenditures under Knightian Uncertainty: An Info-Gap Approach," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(7), pages 830-850, October.
    12. Yang, Zili, 1999. "Should the north make unilateral technology transfers to the south?: North-South cooperation and conflicts in responses to global climate change," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 67-87, January.
    13. Ko, Il-Dong, 1988. "Issues in the control of stock externality problems with inflexible policy measures," ISU General Staff Papers 198801010800009859, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    14. Gong, Liutang & Zou, Heng-fu, 2003. "Military spending and stochastic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 153-170, October.
    15. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    16. Po‐Sheng Lin & Cheng‐Te Lee, 2012. "Military Spending, Threats And Stochastic Growth," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 8-19, January.
    17. Ronen Bar-El & Kobi Kagan & Asher Tishler, 2010. "Forward-Looking versus Shortsighted Defense Budget Allocation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(4), pages 638-662, August.
    18. Carlos Seiglie, 1999. "Altruism, Foreign Aid and Humanitarian Military Intervention," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(2), pages 207-223, September.
    19. José L Torres, 2020. "The production of national defense and the macroeconomy," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(10), pages 1-18, October.
    20. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Differential Games and Oligopoly Theory: An Overview," Working Papers 369, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:22:y:1978:i:4:p:547-564. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.