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Market Power and Renewables: The Effects of Ownership Transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Bahn
  • Mario Samano
  • Paul Sarkis

Abstract

Adding renewable energy sources (RES) to an electricity market has an ambiguous effect on wholesale prices. The merit order effect (MoE) has a downward pressure on prices while, with market power, higher inframarginal rents will tend to increase prices. We quantify the interaction of the two effects in the Ontario electricity market. We identify the market power effect by simulating transfers of RES capacity from the fringe to larger firms: these transfers increase prices by up to 24%. We then add RES capacity and allocate it to players with varying levels of market power. Following a net expansion of RES capacity of 5% relative to total capacity, prices decrease by 30% when new capacity is assigned to the fringe, but only by 7% when assigned to the largest firm. Our findings show that the MoE is largely mitigated by market power, hence the importance of the market structure in the design of uniform incentives for RES adoption.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Bahn & Mario Samano & Paul Sarkis, 2021. "Market Power and Renewables: The Effects of Ownership Transfers," The Energy Journal, , vol. 42(4), pages 195-225, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:42:y:2021:i:4:p:195-225
    DOI: 10.5547/01956574.42.4.obah
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David P. Brown and Andrew Eckert, 2020. "Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Generation: The Role of Renewable Compensation Policies," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 61-88.
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    5. Christopher R. Knittel & Konstantinos Metaxoglou & Andre Trindade, 2015. "Natural Gas Prices and Coal Displacement: Evidence from Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 21627, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lamp, Stefan & Samano, Mario, 2022. "Large-scale battery storage, short-term market outcomes, and arbitrage," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    2. Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Bolun Xu, 2024. "Battery Operations in Electricity Markets: Strategic Behavior and Distortions," Papers 2406.18685, arXiv.org.
    3. Stefan Lamp & Mario Samano, 2023. "(Mis)allocation of Renewable Energy Sources," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(1), pages 195-229.
    4. Stefano Frizzo Stefenon & Laio Oriel Seman & Viviana Cocco Mariani & Leandro dos Santos Coelho, 2023. "Aggregating Prophet and Seasonal Trend Decomposition for Time Series Forecasting of Italian Electricity Spot Prices," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(3), pages 1-18, January.
    5. Xiangchu Xu & Zewei Zhan & Zengqiang Mi & Ling Ji, 2023. "An Optimized Decision Model for Electric Vehicle Aggregator Participation in the Electricity Market Based on the Stackelberg Game," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(20), pages 1-26, October.
    6. Geert Van Moer, 2024. "Secret Bilateral Forward Contracting," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 807-847, June.
    7. Filippos Ioannidis & Kyriaki Kosmidou & Kostas Andriosopoulos & Antigoni Everkiadi, 2021. "Assessment of the Target Model Implementation in the Wholesale Electricity Market of Greece," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-22, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Renewable energy sources; market power; merit order effect; wholesale electricity prices;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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