IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/enejou/v27y2006i3p65-90.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

From Investor-owned Utility to Independent Power Producer

Author

Listed:
  • Jun Ishii

Abstract

We examine the issue of why some parent companies of U.S. electric utilities have expanded into domestic independent power production (IPP) but not others. We evaluate the conjecture that the parent companies who have chosen to participate in recently restructured U.S. wholesale electricity markets are those with the most generation cost advantages. Specifically, we empirically investigate the link between apparent advantages in two types of generation costs — operation &maintenance (O&M) and capital — and the IPP participation decision. We use electric utility data from FERC Form 1 and combine it with IPP data collected from various industry sources. The data is analyzed using both a descriptive approach and a simple, empirical competitive entry model. We find that utilities with lower O&M costs are more likely to expand into IPP. Also, utility financial characteristics, reflecting possible capital cost advantages, seem to matter mainly for the largest utilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Jun Ishii, 2006. "From Investor-owned Utility to Independent Power Producer," The Energy Journal, , vol. 27(3), pages 65-90, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:65-90
    DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No3-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No3-5
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol27-No3-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Erin T. Mansur, 2003. "Vertical Integration in Restructured Electricity Markets: Measuring Market Efficiency and Firm Conduct," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm430, Yale School of Management.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stratford Douglas, 2006. "Measuring Gains from Regional Dispatch: Coal-Fired Power Plant Utilization and Market Reforms," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 119-138.
    2. Severin Borenstein, 2005. "The Long-Run Efficiency of Real-Time Electricity Pricing," The Energy Journal, , vol. 26(3), pages 93-116, July.
    3. Meade, Richard, 2005. "Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in Liberalized Electricity Systems," Working Paper Series 3859, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    4. Sirin, Selahattin Murat & Erten, Ibrahim, 2022. "Price spikes, temporary price caps, and welfare effects of regulatory interventions on wholesale electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    5. SMEERS, Yves, 2005. "How well can one measure market power in restructured electricity systems ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Hogan, Seamus & Meade, Richard, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Market Power in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series 19052, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    7. Meade, Richard, 2005. "Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in Liberalized Electricity Systems," Working Paper Series 18954, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    8. Weigt, Hannes, 2009. "A Review of Liberalization and Modeling of Electricity Markets," MPRA Paper 65651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Helman, Udi, 2006. "Market power monitoring and mitigation in the US wholesale power markets," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 877-904.
    10. Mansur, Erin T, 2007. "Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in Electricity Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 125-156, February.
    11. Frank A. Wolak, 2007. "Quantifying the supply-side benefits from forward contracting in wholesale electricity markets," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(7), pages 1179-1209.
    12. Vítor Marques & Isabel Soares & Adelino Fortunato, 2012. "Application of a Structural Model to the Spanish Electricity Wholesale Market," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 65-108.
    13. Orvika Rosnes, 2008. "The Impact of Climate Policies on the Operation of a Thermal Power Plant," The Energy Journal, , vol. 29(2), pages 1-22, April.
    14. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18954 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Anderson, Edward J. & Hu, Xinmin, 2008. "Forward contracts and market power in an electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 679-694, May.
    16. Hogan, Seamus & Meade, Richard, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Market Power in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series 3959, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    17. repec:ers:journl:v:xv:y:2012:i:sie:p:65-108 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura, 2006. "Comparison of Electricity Deregulation around the World and Implications for Ireland," Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Articles, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), vol. 2006(3-Autumn), pages 38-63.
    19. Kai-Uwe Kühn & Matilde Machado, 2004. "Bilateral Market Power and Vertical Integration in the Spanish Electricity Spot Market," Working Papers wp2004_0414, CEMFI.
    20. repec:vuw:vuwscr:19052 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Elizabeth Armington & Eric Emch & Ken Heyer, 2006. "The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 29(4), pages 305-326, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:65-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.