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Regulation of an Electric Power Transmission Company

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  • Thomas-Olivier Léautier

Abstract

Designing regulatory contracts for the operators of power transmission networks has become a critical policy issue in the United States. In this paper, a regulatory contract is proposed that induces network operators to optimally expand the grid, which is crucial for the emergence of efficient wholesale power markets, while also satisfying the other traditional regulatory objectives. The proposed mechanism is readily implementable, since it builds on a contract currently in place in England and Wales.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas-Olivier Léautier, 2000. "Regulation of an Electric Power Transmission Company," The Energy Journal, , vol. 21(4), pages 61-92, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:21:y:2000:i:4:p:61-92
    DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol21-No4-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shmuel S. Oren, 1997. "Economic Inefficiency of Passive Transmission Rights in Congested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 63-83.
    2. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, April.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
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