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The EU Conciliation Committee

Author

Listed:
  • Anne Rasmussen

    (European University Institute, Italy, anne.rasmussen@eui.eu)

Abstract

Since the introduction of the co-decision legislative procedure, the EU has had the possibility to resort to a Conciliation Committee made up of representatives from the European Parliament and the Council to reconcile differences between the two bodies. This article assesses whether the members of this committee have an incentive to take advantage of their ability to present take-it-or-leave-it offers to their parent bodies by examining whether they are representative of their full body and/or whether they represent other interests inside or outside their legislative body. It concludes that the EU Conciliation Committee is generally representative of its parent bodies and that the option to go to conciliation is not a risky tool for them to reach agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Rasmussen, 2008. "The EU Conciliation Committee," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(1), pages 87-113, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:9:y:2008:i:1:p:87-113
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116507085958
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    References listed on IDEAS

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