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Euroscepticism as Anti-Centralization

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  • Simon Hix

    (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK)

Abstract

From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, Euroscepticism is little more than a set of preferences by citizens, parties and interest groups about institutional design in Europe. If actors’ expect policy outcomes to move closer to their ideal positions as a result of European integration, they will be Euro-enthusiastic (as many centrists are). But, if they feel that policies will move further away from their ideal positions, they will be Eurosceptic (as many extremists are). This simple idea has broad historical and geographical relevance, relating to how actors view the design of multilevel polities, and how these institutional preferences change in response to policy outcomes of the central institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Hix, 2007. "Euroscepticism as Anti-Centralization," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(1), pages 131-150, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:131-150
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116507073291
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tsebelis, George, 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 591-608, September.
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