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European Integration, Intergovernmental Bargaining, and Convergence of Party Programmes

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  • Han Dorussen

    (University of Essex, UK)

  • Kyriaki Nanou

    (University of Essex, UK)

Abstract

Over the past 50 years, the European Union (EU) has dramatically increased its policy-making power. However, there remains considerable variation over time as well as across policy areas in the relative power of the EU and the member states. The variation is likely to influence EU-wide bargaining. Following the logic of bargaining games with domestically constrained actors, or two-level games, the changes in the bargaining environment may also influence party competition within the member states of the European Union. Using manifesto data for 1951–2001, this article examines convergence of party programmes across Western Europe. It is shown that European integration has increasingly constrained the range of policy platforms. Moreover, we generally find a stronger effect if and when countries are actually members of the EU. European integration bolsters programmatic convergence of Euro-friendly as well as Eurosceptic parties. However, European integration particularly influences the convergence of Eurosceptic parties in EU member states.

Suggested Citation

  • Han Dorussen & Kyriaki Nanou, 2006. "European Integration, Intergovernmental Bargaining, and Convergence of Party Programmes," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(2), pages 235-256, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:2:p:235-256
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116506063709
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cal Le Gall & Corentin Poyet, 2017. "The effect of supranational economic constraints on MPs issue attention: the case of France," Post-Print hal-01542581, HAL.
    2. Massimo Bordignon & Simona Scabrosetti, 2016. "The Political Economy of Financing the EU budget," Working papers 42, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.

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