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National Parties in the European Parliament

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Whitaker

    (University of Leicester, UK, rcw11@le.ac.uk)

Abstract

The European Parliament’s increased legislative role in recent years means that its actions are now more likely to have an impact on national parties’ policy choices and, indirectly, on their electoral fortunes. This article examines the extent to which national party delegations deal with this by ensuring representativeness among their committee contingents. Using a technique borrowed from Cox and McCubbins (1993), the article compares the voting behaviour of committee contingents with their national party delegations on the basis of roll-call votes. The analysis shows that, for the most part, national parties ensure higher levels of representativeness on committees that have legislative power. The results support the assertion that, as the European Parliament’s actions matter more, national parties have become more concerned with their MEPs’ activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Whitaker, 2005. "National Parties in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:6:y:2005:i:1:p:5-28
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116505049606
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon Hix, 2001. "Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament: An Application of Nominate to the EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 663-688, November.
    2. Moser, Peter, 1996. "The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What Are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis (1994)," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 834-838, December.
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