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The Power of Institutions

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  • Christine Mahoney

    (Pennsylvania State University, USA)

Abstract

This article investigates the ways in which government activity, or demand-side forces, influence interest mobilization and formal inclusion in the policy-making process in the European Union. Drawing on an original dataset of nearly 700 civil society groups active in the European Union, the paper provides empirical evidence of three routes by which the EU institutions influence interest group activity: (1) direct interest group subsidy; (2) manipulation of the establishment and composition of formal arenas of political debate; and (3) broader, system-wide expansion of competencies and selective development of chosen policy areas.

Suggested Citation

  • Christine Mahoney, 2004. "The Power of Institutions," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(4), pages 441-466, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:5:y:2004:i:4:p:441-466
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116504047312
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hall, Richard L. & Wayman, Frank W., 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 797-820, September.
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