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Does European Integration Lead to a `Presidentialization' of Executive Politics?

Author

Listed:
  • Hanna Bäck

    (University of Mannheim, Germany, Hanna.Baeck@mzes.uni-mannheim.de)

  • Patrick Dumont

    (University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, patrick.dumont@uni.lu)

  • Henk Erik Meier

    (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Germany, Henk.Erik.Meier@uni-muenster.de)

  • Thomas Persson

    (Uppsala University, Sweden, Thomas.Persson@statsvet.uu.se)

  • KÃ¥re Vernby

    (Uppsala University, Sweden, Kare.Vernby@statsvet.uu.se)

Abstract

In this article, we address recent claims that executive— legislative relations in parliamentary democracies are undergoing important changes owing to either a `presidentialization' or a `Europeanization' of domestic political systems. Therefore, we test empirically whether parliamentary democracies are indeed experiencing changes in executive—legislative relations and whether these developments can, in part, be explained by an increase in European integration. Using data on ministerial selection in Swedish cabinets during the years 1952—2006, we find that there appears to be a slight tendency towards `presidentialization', which is indicated by a decrease in ministers with a parliamentary background being appointed, and that there exists some support for the notion that Sweden's political and economic integration into the European Union is part of the explanation for this change.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanna Bäck & Patrick Dumont & Henk Erik Meier & Thomas Persson & KÃ¥re Vernby, 2009. "Does European Integration Lead to a `Presidentialization' of Executive Politics?," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 226-252, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:10:y:2009:i:2:p:226-252
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116509103369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amorim Neto, Octavio & Strøm, Kaare, 2006. "Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 619-643, October.
    2. Indridason, Indridi H. & Kam, Christopher, 2008. "Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(4), pages 621-656, October.
    3. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 593-629, July.
    4. Stanley Hoffmann, 1982. "Reflections on the Nation‐State in Western Europe Today," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 21-38, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hanna Bäck & Marc Debus & Wolfgang C. Müller, 2016. "Intra-party diversity and ministerial selection in coalition governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(3), pages 355-378, March.
    2. Kodila-Tedika, Oasis & Khalifa, Sherif & Konso Mulali, Ben, 2020. "Who Becomes Minister in an Autocratic Regime? Evidence From DRC," MPRA Paper 103022, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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