IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ecdequ/v35y2021i1p66-83.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Is Tax Competition Strategic? Spatial Distributions of Business Property Tax Abatements in the Chicago Suburbs

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Funderburg
  • Joshua Drucker
  • David Merriman
  • Rachel Weber

Abstract

The authors analyze the locations of property tax abatements awarded to businesses in Cook County, Illinois from 2012 to 2014 to explore their spatial distribution and to examine local government motivations for awarding incentives. The authors’ analysis, which controls for the spatial distribution of businesses, reveals a clustering of abatements at intramunicipal geographic scales. They also find amplified probabilities that abatements are awarded to businesses located near tax increment financing districts or enterprise zones. These patterns suggest that local governments use abatements in a strategic fashion to advance policy goals. The authors use the same data to develop three indices of the degree of abatement clustering at the municipal scale for each of the 64 municipalities in Cook County that awarded five or more abatements. Most of the Chicago suburbs exhibit a pattern consistent with the strategic award of business tax incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Funderburg & Joshua Drucker & David Merriman & Rachel Weber, 2021. "Is Tax Competition Strategic? Spatial Distributions of Business Property Tax Abatements in the Chicago Suburbs," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 35(1), pages 66-83, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecdequ:v:35:y:2021:i:1:p:66-83
    DOI: 10.1177/0891242420977694
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0891242420977694
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0891242420977694?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anderson, John E. & Wassmer, Robert W., 1995. "The decision to 'bid for business': Municipal behavior in granting property tax abatements," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 739-757, December.
    2. Bondonio, Daniele & Engberg, John, 2000. "Enterprise zones and local employment: evidence from the states' programs," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 519-549, September.
    3. Gilles Duranton & Henry G. Overman, 2005. "Testing for Localization Using Micro-Geographic Data," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(4), pages 1077-1106.
    4. Gilles Duranton & Henry G. Overman, 2008. "Exploring The Detailed Location Patterns Of U.K. Manufacturing Industries Using Microgeographic Data," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 213-243, February.
    5. Edward J. Feser & Stuart H. Sweeney, 2000. "A test for the coincident economic and spatial clustering of business enterprises," Journal of Geographical Systems, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 349-373, December.
    6. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, January.
    7. Christopher Berry, 2008. "Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 802-820, October.
    8. John E. Anderson & Robert W. Wassmer, 2000. "Bidding for Business: The Efficacy of Local Economic Development Incentives in a Metropolitan Area," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number bb.
    9. Jensen,Nathan M. & Malesky,Edmund J., 2019. "Incentives to Pander," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108408530, January.
    10. George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, 2019. "Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: George R Zodrow (ed.), TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE Selected Essays of George R. Zodrow, chapter 17, pages 525-542, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
    12. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    13. Brueckner, Jan K. & Saavedra, Luz A., 2001. "Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property-Tax Competition?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(2), pages 203-230, June.
    14. Drucker, Joshua & Funderburg, Richard & Merriman, David & Weber, Rachel, 2020. "Do local governments use business tax incentives to compensate for high business property taxes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    15. Byrne, Paul F., 2005. "Strategic interaction and the adoption of tax increment financing," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 279-303, May.
    16. Geoffrey Hewings & John Parr, 2007. "Spatial Interdependence in a Metropolitan Setting," Spatial Economic Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 7-22.
    17. Robert W. Wassmer & John E. Anderson, 2001. "Bidding for Business: New Evidence on the Effect of Locally Offered Economic Development Incentives in a Metropolitan Area," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 15(2), pages 132-148, May.
    18. Burbidge, John & Cuff, Katherine & Leach, John, 2006. "Tax competition with heterogeneous firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 533-549, February.
    19. Richard G Funderburg & Xiaoxue Zhou, 2013. "Trading Industry Clusters amid the Legacy of Industrial Land-Use Planning in Southern California," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 45(11), pages 2752-2770, November.
    20. Benoy Jacob & Daniel McMillen, 2015. "Border Effects in Suburban Land Use," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 68(3S), pages 855-874, September.
    21. Abizadeh, Sohrab & Cyrenne, Philippe, 1997. "On Distinguishing between Leviathan and Public Interest Governments in a Federal State," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 281-299, September.
    22. Ann Markusen (ed.), 2007. "Reining in the Competition for Capital," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ricc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Drucker, Joshua & Funderburg, Richard & Merriman, David & Weber, Rachel, 2020. "Do local governments use business tax incentives to compensate for high business property taxes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. Sandy Fréret & Denis Maguain, 2017. "The effects of agglomeration on tax competition: evidence from a two-regime spatial panel model on French data," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(6), pages 1100-1140, December.
    3. Zodrow, George R, 2003. "Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(6), pages 651-671, November.
    4. Matthieu Leprince & Sonia Paty & Emmanuelle Reulier, 2005. "Choix d'imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales. Un test sur les départements français," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(1), pages 67-93.
    5. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Externalités fiscales horizontales et verticales. Où en est la théorie du fédéralisme financier ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 115(1), pages 17-63.
    6. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2013. "The economics and empirics of tax competition: A survey," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 163, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    7. Carlsen, Fredrik & Langset, Bjorg & Rattso, Jorn, 2005. "The relationship between firm mobility and tax level: Empirical evidence of fiscal competition between local governments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 273-288, September.
    8. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2013. "Identifying local tax mimicking: Administrative borders and a policy reform," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 157, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    9. Michael P. Devereux & Simon Loretz, 2013. "What Do We Know About Corporate Tax Competition?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 66(3), pages 745-774, September.
    10. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2014. "Identifying local tax mimicking with administrative borders and a policy reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 41-51.
    11. Carlianne Patrick, 2014. "The economic development incentives game: an imperfect information, heterogeneous communities approach," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 53(1), pages 137-156, August.
    12. Cassette, Aurélie & Paty, Sonia, 2006. "La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 78.
    13. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
    14. Wilson, John Douglas & Janeba, Eckhard, 2005. "Decentralization and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1211-1229, July.
    15. Brülhart, Marius & Bucovetsky, Sam & Schmidheiny, Kurt, 2015. "Taxes in Cities," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1123-1196, Elsevier.
    16. Thierry Madiès, 1997. "Concurrence fiscale et intercommunalité," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 63(1), pages 195-228.
    17. Wang, Jian & Wu, Qun & Yan, Siqi & Guo, Guancheng & Peng, Shangui, 2020. "China’s local governments breaking the land use planning quota: A strategic interaction perspective," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    18. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Les stratégies fiscales des collectivités locales. De la théorie à la réalité," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 94(3), pages 283-315.
    19. Lars P Feld, 2004. "On Tax Competition: The (Un-)Expected Advantages of Decentralized Fiscal Autonomy," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200425, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    20. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 11, pages 195-208, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ecdequ:v:35:y:2021:i:1:p:66-83. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.