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Are complex game models empirically relevant?

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  • Catherine C. Langlois

Abstract

This essay on the empirical relevance of game theoretic models in International Relations is developed in three parts. First it reviews Allan and Dupont’s arguments for a tradeoff between model complexity and empirical robustness. Second, it re-conceptualizes model complexity and shifts the discussion of a tradeoff between between empirics and model complexity by considering the empirical relevance rather than the empirical robustness of a model. Finally it assesses the link between empirical relevance and complexity with reference to models in the crisis bargaining and the war and bargaining literatures.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine C. Langlois, 2018. "Are complex game models empirically relevant?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(1), pages 3-17, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:35:y:2018:i:1:p:3-17
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894217733889
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(1), pages 123-133, February.
    2. Robert Powell, 2004. "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 344-361, April.
    3. Langlois, Catherine C. & Langlois, Jean-Pierre P., 2006. "When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War: Rational Escalation and the Failure of Bargaining," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 645-669, October.
    4. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 621-632, November.
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