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The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes

Author

Listed:
  • Todd L. Allee

    (Department of Political Science University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois, USA, tallee@uiuc.edu)

  • Paul K. Huth

    (Department of Government & Politics University of Maryland College Park, Maryland, USA)

Abstract

Territorial disputes are a common source of armed conflict and war, yet, during the twentieth century, governments have resolved dozens of territorial disputes through recourse to international arbitration or adjudication. In this research we consider why governments agree to international legal dispute settlement as a means of resolving territorial disputes. We put forward and test three explanations for the decision to pursue legal dispute settlement: a realist explanation, a domestic “political cover†explanation, and a legal “focal point†explanation. Results obtained from a series of generalized estimating equation (GEE) models reveal considerable support for arguments which highlight the domestic political cover function of international arbitration and adjudication.

Suggested Citation

  • Todd L. Allee & Paul K. Huth, 2006. "The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(4), pages 285-307, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:23:y:2006:i:4:p:285-307
    DOI: 10.1080/07388940600972644
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Allee, Todd L. & Huth, Paul K., 2006. "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 219-234, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. David A. Welch, 2017. "The Justice Motive in East Asia’s Territorial Disputes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 71-92, January.

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