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A Theory of Armament

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  • Ido Oren

    (University of Minnesota)

Abstract

I develop a theory explaining how states decide how much armament to acquire. The theory treats states as unitary optimizers choosing between guns and butter, and it offers a novel exposition of the role intentions play in armament decisions-how they are perceived, and how their assessment interacts with the assessment of power. One of the results deduced from the theory is that if statesmen worry about intentions more than about power, then high arms levels possessed by one state will be matched by low arms levels possessed by another, this prediction sharply contradicts conventional wisdom about the nature of arms-races. Statistical analysis of the Superpowers' cold war interaction-which supports the theory-is briefly discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ido Oren, 1998. "A Theory of Armament," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 16(1), pages 1-29, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:16:y:1998:i:1:p:1-29
    DOI: 10.1177/073889429801600101
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, 1987. "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?," International Economic Association Series, in: Christian Schmidt (ed.), The Economics of Military Expenditures, chapter 9, pages 180-196, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Charles H. Anderton, 1989. "Arms Race Modeling," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(2), pages 346-367, June.
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