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Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties

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  • Hans Noel

Abstract

Both the Republican and Democratic parties are internally divided. Each contains a party regular wing, which is interested in winning office and in the compromises necessary to govern. And each contains an ideological wing, which is interested in close adherence to the core coalition of the party. But the nature of the cleavage is very different within the parties. Among Democrats, the cleavage is mild, with most members belonging to the party regular camp, to the chagrin of ideologues, who are for the most part Bernie Sanders supporters. The cleavage among Republicans, though, is so deep that the party could not find a way to bridge it in the so-called invisible primary for 2016, creating an opening for Donald Trump, who is from neither camp.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Noel, 2016. "Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 667(1), pages 166-188, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:667:y:2016:i:1:p:166-188
    DOI: 10.1177/0002716216662433
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Layman, Geoffrey C. & Carsey, Thomas M. & Green, John C. & Herrera, Richard & Cooperman, Rosalyn, 2010. "Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 324-346, May.
    2. Kathleen Bawn & Frances Rosenbluth, 2006. "Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 251-265, April.
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